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FUTURE SECURITY APPROACHES AND BIOMETRICS
Serguei Boukhonine
Vlad Krotov
Barry Rupert
University of Houston
vokrotov@uh.edu

ABSTRACT
Threats to information security are proliferating rapidly, placing demanding requirements on
protecting tangible and intangible business and individual assets. Biometrics can improve security
by replacing or complementing traditional security technologies. This tutorial discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of biometrics and traditional security approaches, current and future
applications of biometrics, performance evaluation measures of biometric systems, and privacy
issues surrounding the new technology.
Keywords: biometrics, computer security, information security, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea behind biometrics is not new. Even in ancient Egypt administrative workers used unique
body characteristics to identify construction workers and ensure a fair distribution of food.
Ashbourn [2000] relates a story about Khasekem, an administrator under the Pharaoh Khaefre,
who was responsible for distributing food among construction workers. When giving out food
allowances to the craftsmen, he discovered that some of them would attempt to receive their food
allowance twice. To prevent future cases of fraud, Khasekem decided to create a profile for each
of the construction workers. Besides such basic information as name, age, place of origin, and
occupation, each profile included some of the unique physical and behavioral characteristics of
the worker. Without the benefit of today’s computing power, Khasekem managed to employ
biometrics to eliminate what we now call double dipping.
Closer to modern times, Frenchman Alphonse Bertillon proposed a methodology for identifying
criminals by anatomical measurements. This methodology, called judicial anthropometry, became
popular in Europe and the U.S. In 1823, the research of the Czech Jan Evangelista Purkinje
forced the scientific community to accept the idea that fingerprints are unique for each individual.
The scientific thinking which emerged during the nineteenth century allowed for the development
of real-world applications of fingerprint technology in the beginning of the twentieth century. In
1901 Scotland Yard became the first police force to adopt a fingerprinting system. Fingerprinting
technology, now used throughout the world, is the best known example of biometrics. Other
types of biometrics were not widely used until the end of the twentieth century when computers
and other technologies made new approaches possible.
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The tragic events of 9/11 created a new wave of interest in biometrics in the United States and
other countries. This revived interest can be attributed to the potential for computer-powered
biometric technologies to bring national security to a higher level of effectiveness. In June 2004,
The Department of Homeland Security awarded a multi-billion dollar contract for the US-VISIT
project to Accenture [eWeek, 2004]. The US-VISIT project involves developing a computer
system that uses fingerprints and face recognition to track millions of visitors to the United States.
Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, says that the primary reason behind using
biometrics for tighter boarder control is that traditional security approaches do not provide an
adequate level of security [Long, 2005]. For Chertoff, “in the area of international travel,
biometrics is the way forward in virtually every respect” [Long, 2005].
The UK Passport Service (UKPS) in partnership with several governmental bodies and Atos
Origin, a consulting firm, is working on introducing national identity cards (passports) with
biometrics features [UKPS, 2005]. A number of other countries are either piloting or planning to
introduce National ID cards with biometric security features [Nanavati et al., 2002].
Endorsements of biometric technology by influential organizations, as well as extensive coverage
of the technology by the mass-media, may create an impression that biometrics is totally
replacing old approaches to security. This is not true, at least at this stage of development of the
technology. For biometrics to become commonplace, the technology must be reliable,
inexpensive, easy to use, deployable in a variety of environments, and non-invasive. Moreover,
the end users of biometric solutions must be educated about the technology and comfortable with
the privacy implications of the technology.
A decision to implement biometric security systems must be based on thorough comparative
evaluation of biometrics in relation to traditional security approaches. To perform an evaluation,
both the basic operating principles of the various biometric solutions and their strengths and
weaknesses must be understood. Privacy implications of biometrics are also important when
deploying biometric solutions. The purpose of this tutorial is to educate the reader on these (and
many other) dimensions.
This tutorial begins with the discussion of numerous security threats faced today by a typical
organization. Then we discuss strengths and weaknesses of traditional security approaches in
addressing these threats (Section II). Section III begins with an elaborate definition of the term
“biometrics” followed by a discussion of some of the fundamental operating principles behind
biometric systems. After that we discuss, in detail, each of the main types of biometrics
technologies (Section IV). For each of these types of biometrics, we discuss operating principles,
advantages and disadvantages, and vulnerabilities to spoofing. The section also looks at some of
the less common and emerging types of biometric technologies. In Section V we provide
examples of current and future applications of biometric technologies. We look at biometric
system performance from both technical and social perspectives in Section VI. The tutorial ends
with a discussion of privacy concerns related to biometrics (Section VII) and with implications for
research (Section VIII).
PROLIFERATION OF SECURITY THREATS
Even though the current publicity surrounding biometrics can be largely attributed to its recent
application in the public sector, biometric security technologies evolved because of the
proliferation of computer security threats. It was not until the mid-to-late 1980s that networked
computing became sufficiently ubiquitous for penetrations to become a significant problem. The
growth of the Internet, e-commerce, and other computer technologies since the 1990s magnified
existing threats while giving rise to new classes of threats (Table 1). Driven by these threats, what
were then new computer security approaches, such as virtual private networks (VPN) and public
key cryptography, gained widespread popularity?
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Table 1. Perceived Computer Security Threats Comparison: 1992 Versus 2004

Most severe threats in 1992
Natural Hazards
Inadequate control over media
Weak and Ineffective Controls
Hacking
Access to system by
competitors

Most severe threats in 2004
Theft of Proprietary Info
Sabotage
Denial of Service
System Penetration
Computer Viruses
Abuse of Wireless Network
Insider Net Abuse
Telecom Fraud
Financial Fraud
Unauthorized Insider Access
Laptop theft
Telecom Eavesdropping
Misuse of Public Web
Applications
Reprinted with permission from Computer Security Institute, 2004

Biometric technology, the subject of this tutorial, is an emerging security approach. One of the
primary differences between biometrics and some other new computer security technologies is
that biometrics is not a pure network security measure. While security measures such as
cryptography and VPN are used primarily to prevent unauthorized access to intangible resources,
biometrics can be used in both network security and more tangible domains, such as access
control and crime/terrorism prevention. Since biometrics can be applied in many domains, the
technology can, potentially, become a widely used security approach.
II. TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES
A number of security approaches have been developed in response to proliferating threats to
security. Both traditional and biometric security approaches can be broken down into two general
types:

•
•

passive, and
active.

Passive approaches are like a shield - they protect against a clear and present danger such as a
hacker attempting to access a computer system. Traditional security technologies are mostly
passive. Active approaches are more like prevention via a preemptive strike, for instance,
arresting terrorists before they plant a bomb. One of the traditional ways to search proactively for
and identify lawbreakers relies on massive use of manpower such as police on patrol or security
guards in casinos watching closed circuit television in the hopes of identifying known cheats.
Needless to say, that measure of active security is costly and is not widely used in a commercial
environment. Even data mining numerous electronic databases (e.g. in an attempt to detect
suspicious activities of a suspect) may be troublesome, since a suspect may use multiple
identities.
Another fundamental weakness of traditional security approaches is that they are based on either
•
•
•

what you know (i.e., password or PIN) or
what you have (i.e., keys, cards, etc.), or a
combination of both (ATM card + PIN) [Ratha et al., 2001].

A fundamental problem with PINs and passwords is that, to be effective, they must be complex.
However, complexity of passwords and PINs makes it hard for users to remember them. Because
of that, a user may write down his or her password on a note and attach it to the monitor or to the
back side of the keyboard. Thus, a strong password policy may not contribute to overall system
security [Reid, 2004]. Another fundamental problem with PINs and passwords is that they identify
a card rather than its user [Ashbourn, 2000]. In other words, even though a person knows the PIN
associated with the card or password associated with the username, that person may not actually
be the owner of the card or the authorized user. In addition, passwords are often easy to guess,
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crack by brute force, or obtain through other means such as social engineering (e.g. an intruder
posing as a system administrator calling an employee and asking for the user’s network
password). Obtaining the card and PIN or the username and password might be difficult, but it is
far from impossible. A serious flaw with this possession requirement is that anybody can gain
access to a resource if she or he has a security artifact (e.g. a key or a card). Many of the security
artifacts can be easily counterfeited [Ashbourn, 2000]. Even sophisticated security mechanisms,
such as an ATM card, can be lost, stolen or maliciously taken away and used by an unauthorized
person. Thus, card/PIN or username/password combinations provide relatively weak network
security. Table 2 provides a brief overview of strengths and weaknesses of traditional security
approaches.
Table 2. Traditional Security Approaches
Security Approach

Strengths

Weaknesses

Lock and key
Lock and key is probably the oldest security
mechanism used to protect assets

Low cost, simplicity,
ease of use, robustness

Can be easily duplicated; not
convenient to carry; can be
lost or stolen; hard to manage
in large organizations

Numeric keypad
A security mechanism that requires users to enter a
password using a numeric keypad to gain access to a
premise or an asset

Easy to use and
maintain, robust

Often forgotten; low security

Magnetic stripe card
Magnetic stripe card is usually a plastic card with a
magnetic strip that contains authentication
information. Credit cards are an example of a
magnetic stripe card

Low cost, easy to
reprogram, easy to
manage

Easy to duplicate; sensitive to
environment

Punched card
Punched card is usually a paper card with holes
punched on it to record information, such as access
code

Cheap to make and easy
to manage

Easy to duplicate; low security

Proximity card
Proximity card is a wireless access security device,
which opens a premise when being placed in the
immediate vicinity of a radio frequency reader that
wirelessly reads authentication information from the
card

No physical contact—
very robust

Expensive and interferes with
other electrical devices

Wiegand card [Ashbourn, 2000]
Wiegand card employs a unique technology that is
used to transmit information between a card and a
slot-based reader

Robust and secure; noncontact; can be used in
harsh environments

Expensive

Infrared card
Bar code information on an infrared card can be read
only with the help on an infrared reader – it cannot be
seen by a person or copied with a copy machine [ATI,
2004]
Smart card
Smart cards are plastic cards with an embedded
microprocessor and/or memory chip used for storing
information and providing secure exchange between
the card and a reader
Adapted from Ashbourn, 2000

Secure, inexpensive

Can be easily duplicated,
sensitive to harsh environment

Secure; can store a
relatively large amount of
data

Relatively expensive, requires
direct contact, card contacts
are sensitive to dust and wear
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III. BIOMETRICS
DEFINITION
Biometrics can be defined briefly as methods for recognizing people based on unique
physiological or behavioral characteristics [Ashbourn, 2000; Jain et al., 2000]. Biometrics
introduces the third “pillar” of security [Reid, 2004]. Traditional security approaches rest on two
pillars: something you know or something you have. Biometrics authenticates or identifies a
person not as much on what she has or knows, but based on something she is (a measurable
trait).
Clarke [1999] provides an expanded definition of biometrics: person-identification techniques
based on such difficult-to-alienate characteristics as appearance, social behavior, bio-dynamics,
natural physiography, and imposed physical characteristics.
•
•
•
•
•

Appearance refers to details of a person’s general visual image, such as shape of a
face distance between eyes, or height.
Social behavior can be manifested, for example, through voice particularities and
body gestures.
Bio-dynamics includes the manner in which he or she writes a signature, performs a
key-stroke, or moves a mouse.
Natural physiography refers to such characteristics as skull measurement or
fingerprint sets.
Imposed physical characteristics involve artificial creation of physical characteristics
of a person by, for example, implanting a microchip under the skin.

Even though these characteristics provide a precise way of classifying different types of
biometrics, biometric types are generally classified based on two generic categories:
physiological and behavioral.
A physiological biometric is a manifestation of some physical trait (e.g. fingerprint pattern or iris
pattern). A behavioral biometric can also be based, in part, on physiological characteristics. For
example, our voice is influenced, in part, by physical characteristics of the diaphragm. In a similar
manner, the length and flexibility of our fingers probably influence, to some extent, our typing
pattern. Still a behavioral type of biometric differs from a physiological one. While physiological
traits are for the most part determined by Mother Nature, behavioral traits are learned. Thus, the
manifestation of behavioral traits involves the application of cognitive processes.
HOW BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES WORK
To discuss biometric technologies, the reader needs to understand the fundamental operating
principles behind biometric systems. As in centuries past, biometric technology today relies on
two fundamental mechanisms
•
•

authentication and
identification.

The objective of authentication is to determine if a particular person is who she or he claims to be,
for instance to cash a check. Identification systems, by contrast, capture a person's biometric
information, say at an airport boarding gate, and then compare it with templates stored in a
database looking for a match. Authentication systems often require active participation by the
individual.
Authentication Systems
The general process for authentication systems is outlined in Figure 1. The authentication
process starts with, for example, an individual inserting a smart or magnetic card into a reader
(instead of a card, the user may key in his or her username). If it is a smart card, the reader reads
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a biometric template from the card. Otherwise, the reader reads the username. Afterwards, the
user's live biometric information is captured and compared with the template either read from the
smart card or obtained from the database. If the system determines that the individual is who she
or he claims to be, access is granted. Otherwise, access is denied. While the authentication
process looks like today’s common security systems, biometric systems differ in several respects.
1. Biometric information captured from the individual attempting to use the card serves
as a means of verifying that the person attempting to use the card is the person to
whom the card was issued.
2. People cannot forget biometrics as one might a PIN.
3. Biometrics are unique for each person.
Figure 1 shows the logic of a typical biometric authentication algorithm
Read
user’s
biometric
template
from card
Individual
inserts
smart or
magnetic
card into
reader

Yes, ID is verified
Individual IS who
he/she claims to be

Yes
Smart
Card?

No
Read
user’s ID
from card

Reader
captures
biometric
data

Captured
biometric
data is
matched
with presaved
biometric
data
(template)

Verify
ID?

Yes

No

Access is
granted
Access is
denied

No, ID is not verified
Individual IS NOT who
he/she claims to be

Figure 1. Biometric Authentication Algorithm
Identification Systems
Identification systems are either passive to the individual (they can be used without the user’s
knowledge) or are active (they require the individual to provide biometric data, that is they require
active cooperation from the user). An example of a passive identification system would be a
surveillance system at a stadium entrance that automatically captures face images of entering
sports fans with the help of a digital camera. The face images captured are then passed to a
computer that attempts to find a face match in a database containing face images of previously
arrested violent fans. In this hypothetical example, the “troublemakers” are being identified
passively.
An iris recognition system installed near the entrance to an airport is a hypothetical example of an
active identification system. A security guard may ask entering passengers to look into an iris
recognition device. The iris image obtained is compared with iris images in a database that
contains iris images of people with a criminal record or people whose personal background may
indicate an inclination to terrorism. If a person is identified as such, more thorough search
procedures may be applied to him or her before the person boards a plane. In this hypothetical
example, criminals are being identified actively, that is they are made aware of the identification
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system by being asked for their cooperation. Figure 2 shows the conceptual algorithm behind an
identification system.

System
captures
biometric
data of
individual

Biometrics are
matched with
records in a
database

System KNOWS
individual

System DOES NOT
know individual

Security
action
Biometrics
deleted

Figure 2. Biometric Identification Algorithm

Under the identification algorithms, the individual does not take any intentional actions to identify
himself or herself. The biometric data is captured by the system automatically, without the active
participation of the user. Then the system uses the database to determine whether the system
knows or does not know the individual. The database can consist of biometric data of people who
impose a potential public threat (e.g. criminals, terrorists, violent sports fans). The primary task of
the system is to try to find a match between the biometric data obtained from the individual and
numerous biometric templates stored in the database. For this reason the process of
identification is also known as a “one-to-many” comparison [Ashbourn, 2000]. If this type of
individual is identified by the system, then action results (e.g. the system notifies the police about
the presence of the individual). Otherwise, the captured biometric data is deleted.
IV. TYPES OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES
Biometric technologies can be classified according to the input data source they rely on for
authentication and identification. Some of the most common body parts that are scanned by
biometric systems are hands, faces, and eyes. Voice is also widely used in such applications as
automated call centers. Table 3 presents a brief comparative overview of these biometric
technology types.
FINGERPRINTING
Operating Principles
The basis for this biometric is that the macro and micro features of each individual’s fingerprint
are unique [Reid, 2004]. Fingerprints are usually captured with the help of a scanner. The image
of a fingerprint can be enrolled and matched using one of the following algorithms: minutia-based,
pattern-based, and hybrid. Enrollment is a process of acquiring a biometric image from an
individual and storing it as a template in a database for future verification of the user’s identity.
Minutia-based algorithms enroll and match fingerprints based on micro characteristics. Micro
characteristics are small details (minutia) of a fingerprint that cannot be seen with the unaided
eye. While minutia are classified into formalized categories, they can be seen as tiny “pixels” or
groups of “pixels” that comprise an image of a fingerprint. Just like a digital image can be reduced
to and analyzed based upon individual pixels, a fingerprint image can also be reduced to “pixels”.
These “pixels” are building blocks of overall fingerprint patterns. Since minutia-based algorithms
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Table 3. Human Body and Types of Biometric Technologies
Body
Part

Biometrics
Type
Fingerprinting
(natural
physiography)

How it works

Advantages

Disadvantages

Use Examples

Uses unique
micro and
macro features
of fingerprints

Easy to use,
inexpensive;
fingerprints
databases are
already
available

Less reliable than
retina or iris
scanning

Access control,
computer
access control

Hand geometry
(natural
physiography)

Captures up to
90 unique hand
characteristics

Easy to use
and
inexpensive

Balky and sensitive
to environment

Access control,
computer
access

Face
Recognition
(natural
physiography/a
ppearance)

Face
recognition
captures
characteristics
of a face either
from video or
still image and
translates them
into digital form
Captures
unique patterns
of an iris

Suitable for
identification
applications,
relatively
unobtrusive

Prone to errors
caused by
environmental
influences (e.g.
light), and personal
changes such as
sunglasses, or
facial hair.;
expensive
Expensive,
sensitive to
environmental
conditions

Identification
(law enforcement); identity
authentication

Retina
Scanning
(natural
physiography)

Captures
unique pattern
of blood vessels

Secure and
accurate

Expensive; requires
perfect alignment usually a user must
look in monocular
or binocular
receptacle

Voice
Recognition
(social
behavior)

Captures
unique
characteristics
of voice

Easy to use
and
understand,
non-intrusive

Sensitive to
background
conditions such as
noises

Hands

Face

Iris Scanning
(natural
physiography)

Eyes

Voice

Secure, does
not need
physical
contact, nonintrusive

High security
applications in
controlled
environments

Automated call
centers

Adapted from Ashbourn [2000]
match fingerprints based on a large number of micro characteristics, these algorithms are usually
more accurate in the matching process than pattern-based algorithms.
Pattern-based algorithms use both micro and macro features of a fingerprint for matching and
enrollment. Macro features are relatively large components of a fingerprint pattern that can be
seen with the unaided eye (arches, loops, and whorls). When macro features are used, a larger
fingerprint image is necessary (a sufficient number of micro features can be captured with only a
portion of a fingerprint image). Authentication based on macro features is usually faster than
authentication based on micro features.
Hybrid algorithm leverages the best features of both minutia-based and pattern based algorithm.
Thus, hybrid algorithms can provide a middle ground between accuracy of minutia-based
algorithm and speed of pattern-based algorithm.
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Advantages
Fingerprinting is the most widely used and accepted form of biometrics [Reid, 2004].
Fingerprinting has been used in criminal justice for many decades. As a result, it is based on
rigorous procedures developed and verified over the years. Criminologists and the general public
accept fingerprinting as a valid form of identification. The popularity of fingerprinting can be also
explained by the relative ease with which this biometric is obtained. The computerized procedure
for obtaining fingerprints (with the help of a finger scanner) is simple when compared to other
biometric procedures, such as iris or retina scans. Another advantage of fingerprint biometrics is
that fingerprint scanners are relatively cheap. A fingerprint scanner can be purchased for under
$50, while an iris scanner can cost around $1000. Furthermore, fingerprint capture is not
sensitive to environmental conditions (such as light) and can be deployed in virtually any
environment.
Disadvantages
The three main disadvantages of fingerprint biometrics are the inability to enroll some users,
performance deterioration over time, association with forensic applications, and possible shortterm changes in a person’s fingerprints [Nanavati et al., 2002].
•

Inability to enroll some users. A small percentage of the population may not (or may
have difficulties with) enrolling in fingerprint systems. Certain ethnic groups (e.g.
black and some Asians) and demographic groups (e.g. older people or people
involved in manual labor) have less distinct fingerprints, which may prevent them
from being enrolled or matched against stored templates.

•

Performance deterioration over time. Performance of some fingerprint systems is
found to drop drastically because of daily wear. The drop in performance can be up
to 25% over the span of 6 weeks for some finger-scan technologies.

•

Association with forensic application. Some individuals feel uncomfortable
participating in authentication procedures traditionally associated with criminals.

•

Short-term changes in fingerprints. Fingerprints of a person performing manual labor
which involves damage to the hand’s skin or working with oily substances (e.g. an
auto mechanic working without gloves) may change the fingerprints pattern or
decrease the readability of the pattern.

Spoofing
In the context of biometric technologies, spoofing is defined as an attempt by an intruder to trick a
biometric system into thinking that it is presented with a real biometric feature of an authorized
user when it is not.
Finger biometric systems can be spoofed [Reid, 2004]. Table 4 summarizes potential spoofing
attacks and ways of mitigating the attacks.
HAND GEOMETRY
Operating Principles
The hand geometry biometric uses the hand’s unique characteristics (e.g. the height and width of
the hand and fingers) to authenticate a person. To enroll in the system, a user places his palm on
a metallic sheet of the specialized hand geometry device. Cameras acquire the 3D image of the
hand and use the image to match with a 3D image of the hand stored at the time of enrollment.
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Table 4. Possible Attacks on Finger Biometric System

Mitigating the attack

Possible Attack
Attacking the physical finger
After obtaining a fingerprint image, a fake
finger can be produced from a number of
materials. In an extreme case, a individual’s
finger can be severed and used for breaking
into the system.

Using artifacts
After a person places a finger on a scanner,
the image of the finger can be left on the
scanning surface. An intruder can place an
object (e.g. a plastic bag with water) on the
scanning surface to trick the system into
thinking that an actual finger is placed. This
spoofing technique is largely based on
operating principles of sensors used to capture
fingerprint images.
Attacking the communication channel
An intruder can use the communication
channel between a scanner and network to
tamper with the biometric data.

Compromising the template
An intruder can break into the system and
change the reference template against which
newly acquired images are compared.
Attacking the fallback system
Occasionally, an authorized user may not have
been previously enrolled in the system.
Moreover, the system can expect failures from
time to time. The fall-back procedure, designed
to take care of these situations, can be taken
advantage of by an intruder

• Sensors measuring temperature or detecting pulse
can be used to detect whether the finger is “alive”
(e.g. measuring temperature or detecting pulse).
• Multiple fingers can be used to authenticate a
person. Capturing fingerprint images of several
fingers without the person knowing is much harder
than obtaining an image of just one finger.
• Finger biometrics can be used together with
passwords or tokens to strengthen authentication.
• Software can be used to remember the last finger
image scanned. An immediate reoccurrence of the
image may signal an intrusion attempt.
• A sensor can be used to detect whether the finger is
“alive” (e.g. measuring temperature or detecting
pulse)

• Continuous monitoring of the connection between
the scanner and the network can be used to prevent
this type of attack. An interruption in connection
may signal an intrusion
• Biometric information can be encrypted to prevent
eavesdropping
• Session keys can be used to ensure that biometric
data is not “replayed”
• Standard information security technologies can be
used to protect template data
• The fallback procedures must be designed in a way
that foresees possible ways of attempting to trick
the system

Adapted from Reid [2004]
Advantages
Hand geometry strengths are[Nanavati et al,, 2002]:
•

Hand geometry is able to operate in harsh environments. The technology is not as
sensitive to light, dust, or temperature as some other biometric technologies.

•

It is a well-established technology. Hand geometry has been used in such
applications as access control for many years. A number of vendors already provide
reliable hand geometry stations.

•

It is relatively non-intrusive. Submitting a hand for measurements is certainly less
intrusive than, for example, positioning one’s eye for iris scanning.
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Hand geometry is a relatively stable physiological characteristic. Unlike fingerprints,
hand geometry is not likely to change significantly in the short term.

Disadvantages
The weaknesses of hand geometry include [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

The accuracy of hand geometry is inherently limited by the lack of physiological
variety in hand geometry characteristics among individuals and by the relatively small
number of hand characteristics that can be captured with a hand scan.

•

The relative dimensions of hand scan stations limit the scope of potential
applications. Hand geometry stations are usually bulky and, as a result, may not be
convenient to use in certain applications. For example, it may not be practical to
place hand geometry scanning stations near each computer on a corporate network

•

The system cannot enroll certain people (e.g. individuals with a crippled arm).

Spoofing
Potential spoofing techniques and mitigation strategies in the case of hand geometry are similar
to those discussed for fingerprinting. However, reproducing a hand without the knowledge of the
individual may not be feasible. While an intruder can potentially copy a person’s fingerprint image
from a flat glass surface and construct a finger with the same fingerprint, reconstructing a hand
geometry (even with the consent of a user who has access to the system) is much more complex.
FACE RECOGNITION
Operating Principles
The face consists of many distinct micro and macro elements [Reid, 2004]. The macro elements
include the mouth, nose, eyes, cheekbones, chin, lips, forehead, and ears. The micro features
include the distances between the macro features (or the distances between macro features and
reference points) and the size of macro features. In addition, faces, like any body parts, radiate
heat. Heat radiation patterns can be captured with the help of infrared cameras and used for
authenticating and identifying users. Face images can be captured either “on the spot” through
real-time acquisition or by photographs or videos. Four major types of algorithms are used for
enrolling and matching a face image:
•

Eigenface. The staring point of eigenface algorithm is capturing a two- dimensional
grayscale image of a face. The unique geometry of the face is then described
mathematically and stored as a template. When a reference face image is obtained, it
is also transformed into a two-dimensional grey-scale image and then matched
against the template.

•

Local Feature Analysis. The first step under this algorithm is identifying reference
points on a face image. A reference point can be a corner of the mouth, an end of an
eyebrow, the center of an eye, and many other “face landscape” features. Reference
points are detected by analyzing the shading around each feature. For example, the
image of one’s nose can be surrounded by shadows that can lead the system to
identify the face image area as a nose and then locate its central point (the tip of the
nose). After all the necessary reference points are identified, the set of reference
points is connected with straight lines forming numerous triangles. For example, a
triangle can be formed by connecting the centers of eyes with each other as well as
the tip of the nose. The angles of the resulting triangles are then measured and
recorded in a template. The template is further used for matching newly acquired
face images. Needless to say, light conditions severely impact the algorithm.

•

Neural Networks. A neural network is a computing paradigm that relies on algorithms
that imitate the processes of a human brain. In a similar way as our brains learn to
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recognize faces, a biometric system can be taught to recognize and differentiate
faces [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Neural networks use a wide array of features to
determine whether the face image is similar to the one previously stored (template).
Each feature “votes” on whether the face is similar or not. A correct vote “raises” the
importance of a particular face feature in further matching attempts. Likewise, an
incorrect vote lowers the importance of a particular feature as a predictor of whether
face images match. Over time, the system learns to recognize faces through this
learning process, which is somewhat similar to a trial and error approach.
Theoretically, this method can produce greater face recognition success rates in
complex environments.
•

Automatic face processing. This algorithm uses macro face measurements and
sizing (e.g. mouth width) to find a match quickly and efficiently. The downside to this
algorithm is that facial expressions can impact recognition effectiveness (e.g. a smile
would change mouth width).

Advantages
Face recognition’s strengths in comparison with other biometrics are [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

Ability to leverage existing equipment and imaging processes. Face recognition
systems do not require specialized hardware unlike other biometric procedures.
Existing hardware capable of image processing can be used with face recognition
software.

•

Ability to operate without physical contact or user complicity. The facial image of an
individual can be acquired in a non-intrusive way even without the user being aware
of the procedure. As a result, face recognition systems can operate in surveillance
mode. Police, government agents, and casinos use face scans to identify criminals.

•

Ability to enroll static images. Most biometric systems require several years to
deploy, since it takes time to collect biometric data on users. Time delay can be less
of a problem in the case of face recognition, since existing sources of facial images of
various groups of individuals are collected over time. Departments of Motor Vehicles
(DMVs), immigrations offices, and other public agencies collect massive databases of
facial images taken in controlled environments.

Disadvantages
Disadvantages of face biometrics include [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

Sensitivity to environment. A number of environmental conditions (e.g. light,
background composition, camera position and many other factors) impact system
accuracy.

•

Sensitivity to changes in physiology. Simple changes in physiology (e.g. new hair
style, make-up, facial hair, glasses) impact system accuracy significantly.

•

Privacy abuse. Since a face image can be taken without the user being aware of it,
privacy abuse is possible. For example, a face recognition system installed in voting
booths in Uganda to prevent voter fraud was found to be highly intimidating to voters
[Nanavati et al., 2002].

Spoofing
One of the ways to spoof a face recognition system is to fake a face. A face can be faked by
obtaining an image of a person’s face (e.g. digital photograph). After an image of an individual’s
face is captured, the system can be tricked in a number of ways:
•

A two-dimensional face image can be presented to a camera. This scam may work
for systems that do not use “active eye” recognition or depth recognition. Active eye

Future Security Approaches and Biometrics by S. Bourkhonine, V. Krotov, and B. Rupert

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 16, 2005) 937- 966

949

recognition makes use of reflective nature of the pupil to locate eyes on a facial
image. Depth recognition adjusts camera’s focal length to capture macro features of
a face. If a plain image is presented to the camera, the focal length will be the same
for all face features and, thus, the system may be able to detect that it is being
presented with a two-dimensional image of the face.
•

Systems with active eye recognition can also be fooled with the help of a twodimensional image. An intruder can cut out the pupil areas in the two-dimensional
image and use the image as a mask. In this way, the system is presented with real
eyes, while the face as a whole is simply a two dimensional image of the real face.
To a certain degree this type of attack is mitigated by requiring the system to detect
face movement for authentication. [Reid, 2004]. In this way, a still image not
exhibiting any movement will not be interpreted by the system as a real face.

•

Another way to spoof a face-recognition system is to replay a previously captured
video of an individual‘s face. The video can be replayed using a laptop or a portable
DVD player. In this case, the face can exhibit some degree of movement and the
system requiring face movement may be fooled. However, active eye detection may
recognize that it is not a real face.

The spoofing techniques discussed above rely on presenting a static image of a face to the
system. Even if a recorded video of a face is used, the image can still be viewed as static, since
the dynamic characteristics of the face in the video are limited to what was recorded. Thus, a
number of challenge and response methods can be used to mitigate this type of attack. An
example of a challenge and response method would be asking the individual to blink a random
number of times in a particular time pattern. Theoretically, even this challenge and response
method can be fooled by creating a complex video model of an individual capable of generating
these dynamic face characteristics. However, the model is likely to be prohibitively complex and
expensive to generate.
Another potential way of spoofing a face recognition system is to present the system with a face
artifact. A face artifact consists of image files that were used by the system during the enrollment
process. Theoretically, these files can be fed into the system without the individual undergoing a
predetermined face image acquisition process. One of the ways of dealing with this attack is to
use encryption to transmit face image data. In this way, it will be difficult if not impossible to
intercept face image data and feed it back into the system.
IRIS SCANNING
Operating Principles
The iris exhibits a unique mosaic texture which can be used for identification and authentication.
To capture a person’s iris, the individual needs to look into a camera. The camera must be
positioned appropriately to localize the image of the iris. After the iris image is captured, simple
logical operators (XOR and AND) can be used to match the iris image obtained with the one
previously stored. As two binary sequences (e.g. 101 and 111 can) can be matched by applying
XOR and AND operators to corresponding bits of each binary sequence, the features of a
person’s iris can be compared to the features of the iris previously stored in a template using
similar logical comparison mechanisms.
Advantages
Iris biometrics is probably the most promising biometric trait [Reid, 2004]. Iris scan’s advantages
over other biometric procedures include:
•

The major advantage of iris biometrics is its accuracy. Biometric systems based on
iris recognition provide virtually no False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and an extremely
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low False Rejection Rate (FRR) of approximately 0.2% in three attempts1 [Reid,
2004]
•

The relatively simple matching algorithm based on XOR and AND operators allows
for extremely fast matching: fir example, 100,000 matches per second can be carried
out even on a 300MHz machine [Reid, 2004].

•

Iris texture is a stable characteristic that does not change over time [Nanavati et al.,
2002]. Part of this stability comes from the iris’s protection by the cornea. The iris is
usually not exposed to harsh conditions and does not change with age.

Disadvantages
Disadvantages of iris-scan include [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

Iris biometric procedures may be difficult to use for some individuals. For an iris to be
scanned, a user needs to align a camera with the eye – a procedure that may not be
easy for disabled individuals or individuals with poor eye sight.

•

Iris-based biometric systems have a propensity towards FRR (Section VI) because
the strict positioning requirements may make it difficult to obtain a quality iris image.
An authorized user may not be granted access because, with the strict positioning
requirements, his or her iris pattern was not scanned properly.

•

Iris scans are perceived to be intrusive by a certain percentage of users. There is
something about the nature of one’s eye as well as its importance in an individual’s
life that makes users uncomfortable about submitting their eyes to a scanning
procedure. Other individuals are worried that the iris scanning camera can damage
their eye sight.

•

Currently, the market for iris acquisition devices lacks competition or
standardization2. Only a small number of companies manufacture iris acquisition
devices all under the license from Irdian [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Thus, it would be
expensive to develop custom security solutions based on iris scanning.

Spoofing
One way to spoof an iris biometric system is to print out a high-quality iris image. The pupil area
can then be cut out so that an intruder can present his pupil together with the fake iris to a
camera. This spoofing technique may be possible due to the robustness of some systems – they
are tolerant to variations in iris image size to loosen strict positioning requirements for iris
acquisition. Using this hidden vulnerability, an intruder can print out an iris image sufficiently large
to hold it in hands to align it with their pupil. Fortunately, an iris biometric system can be taught to
recognize a printed image. No matter how advanced a printing technology is, it uses a particular
pattern for drawing lines and filling in spaces with color.

1

See Section VI for a discussion of FAR and FRR.

2

While devices from different vendors may use similar algorithms or operating principles, they
are not likely to use the same engines. Devices manufactured by different vendors lack common
standards, for example for communicating with computers or standard middleware,
Implementation may differ both on the device level and at the middleware level.
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RETINA SCANNING
Operating Principles
The retina is “the surface on the back of the eye that processes light entering through the pupil”
[Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 106]. The retinas of each individual contain unique patterns of blood
vessels that can be used for identification. This pattern of blood vessels is a unique physiological
characteristic that does not change over time. The process of acquiring a retina image is
relatively complex. Since the retina is an internal surface, specialized hardware and camera
systems are required for image capture. When the retina is scanned, an individual must gaze
directly into the lens of a retina-scanning device, remaining perfectly still. Even a slight movement
can nullify the image acquisition process. In ideal conditions, it usually takes 4-5 seconds to
acquire a retina image [Nanavati et al., 2002]. The retina biometric is used “exclusively for
physical access applications and is usually used in environments requiring exceptionally high
degrees of security and accountability, such as high-level government, military, and corrections
applications” [Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 106].
Advantages
The retina biometric is highly accurate. Since retina patterns are a stable physiological trait and
retina matching algorithms are robust, the retina biometric is highly resistant to false matching
[Nanavati et al., 2002].
Disadvantages
The retina scanning procedure is perceived by some users as difficult to use and intrusive
[Nanavati et al., 2002]. Similar to iris scans, the retina scan procedure requires some experience
and attentiveness from the user. As a result, retina scanning can only be used at present in highsecurity and low-volume physical access and attendance monitoring applications. Thus, retina
scanning procedures may only be appropriate in applications where convenience can be
sacrificed for increased security. In addition, some users view the retina scan procedure as
intrusive, making users reluctant to submit their eyes to this process.
VOICE RECOGNITION
Operating Principles
The voice is both a physiological and a behavioral biometric [Reid, 2004]. Voice is influenced by
physiology. The beautiful sounds that Luciano Povarotti is capable of producing are largely a
function of his unique physiology. However, we tend to absorb voice characteristics of people
that surround us for a substantial period of time. Our voice also changes depending on social
situation – most people probably use different voices when they speak to a telemarketer, a
spouse, or a policeman. Our voice also depends on the environment: a stock broker sounds
differently at home than on a trading floor (hopefully).
Voice characteristics include pitch, frequency, gain or intensity, short-time spectrum of speech,
formant frequencies, linear prediction coefficients, cepstral coefficients, spectograms, and nasal
coarticulation [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Many of these characteristics can only be produced by the
human voice, which means that even sophisticated audio equipment cannot record and then
reproduce these characteristics. However, this restriction does not eliminate the possibility of
spoofing based on playback. The possibility of this type of attack can be significantly reduced by
detecting some of the voice characteristics.
The voice can be captured using the existing infrastructure, such as a phone or a microphone
connected to a computer. Some of the voice interpretation algorithms include [Reid, 2004]:
•

Fixed phrase verification. Under this algorithm, an individual is both enrolled and
identified based on a single phrase. The enrollment phrase is matched with the
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phrased obtained from the individual during the identification procedure simply by
comparing the wave forms of each of the two phrases.
•

Fixed vocabulary verification. A user is enrolled and identified based on a limited
vocabulary of words. A random sequence of words is generated for the user to
pronounce aloud. After the individual pronounces these words (e.g. “one, two, four,
seven”), each word is matched with the word previously recorded from the individual.
After that, a composite match score is generated based on the extent to which
individual words match.

•

Flexible vocabulary verification. Under this algorithm, an individual can use any word
from a given lexicon. During the enrollment process, an individual is asked to repeat
a series of words from the lexicon. The set of words pronounced during the
enrollment process must cover all the phonemes (the vocal building block of each
word) of every word in the lexicon. During the authentication process, the user is
asked to speak a word or a number of words from the lexicon. The words are broken
down into phonemes and then matched with the previously stored phonemes to
authenticate the user.

Advantages
The advantages of voice biometric are [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

Ability to leverage existing hardware infrastructure. Voice can be recorded using
phones or by simply attaching a microphone system to a computer. An organization
can theoretically get by without purchasing expensive specialized hardware.
Furthermore, automated telephone systems are now ubiquitous. These existing
technologies can be leveraged for creating security applications.

•

Resistance to imposters. Some voice characteristics are difficult to fake even using
high-end audio systems. Systems based on voice biometrics can potentially be more
secure than even some finger-scan systems.

•

Non-intrusiveness. The voice scanning procedure is perceived to be less intrusive
than scanning of iris, retina, or even finger.

Disadvantages
The disadvantages of the voice biometric include [Nanavati et al., 2002]:
•

Voice is subject to numerous distortion factors. First of all, the type of hardware used
to record one’s voice can have a significant impact on the quality of the obtained
voice sample. For example, the microphones used in phones are not of a high
quality. But even if high-end voice recording equipment is used, it may still be hard to
obtain a quality voice sample. A user may not know, for example, how to hold and
position the microphone properly. Voice can be distorted or masked by background
noise. Finally, users may unintentionally vary their voice characteristics.

•

Perception of low accuracy. After watching too much TV, some people believe that
their voice can be faked by a skillful impressionist. As was mentioned previously,
some voice characteristics cannot be reproduced artificially even using sophisticated
audio equipment for recording and then playback. Although voices can be faked, it is
not as easy as some think.

•

Large template size. When compared to other types of biometrics, voice templates
require a lot of storage space. While finger or iris templates usually occupy up to 1K
of memory, voice templates can occupy 10K or more.
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OTHER TYPES OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES
In addition to the major techniques listed in Table 3, biometric techniques include vein pattern
scanning, detection of individual scent, measurement of earlobes, facial thermogram procedures,
analysis of individual keystroke dynamics, signature verification, and gait recognition [Ashbourn,
2000; Delac and Grgic, 2004; Jain et al., 2000; Monrose and Rubin, 2000; Nanavati et al., 2002;
Schneier, 1999]. These methodologies, described in Table 5, are less developed and are not
widely used at present.
Table 5. Less Developed Biometric Applications
Biometric Type

Description

Vein Pattern Scanning
(natural physiography)

The vain pattern on the back of the hand and wrist is scanned
while the user grips a bar within a specialized scanning device.
Commercial applications based on this biometric are already
available in ATM banking.
Since each object distributes an odor that is based on the
object’s chemical composition, identifying individuals based on
their unique scent patterns may be possible. However, there are
many unanswered questions, such as how unique individual
scent is and whether the scent can be captured easily by
specialized equipment.
While it is possible to identify unique geometrical characteristics
of an earlobe, the procedure is likely to be inconvenient and is
not likely to be more accurate than measuring other body parts.
The face below the skin emits unique infrared patterns that can
be captured by a specialized scanning device. While the
technology is highly accurate, its high cost is probably the main
factor preventing the emergence of commercial applications.
Keystroke dynamics is a behavioral characteristic. Individual
keystroke dynamics, such as speed of typing, pauses between
words, and intervals between individual characters, could
potentially provide on-going identity verification rather just onetime verification at the beginning of a computer session.
A signature is a behavioral characteristic. Signature verification
is based not only on the appearance of the signature, but also on
signature dynamics: the pressure applied to the pen, the speed
at which individual pen stroked are executed, the overall time it
takes an individual to reproduce his or her signature, and other
characteristics.
Rhythmic patterns associated with walking stride can be
potentially used in surveillance. However, many principal
questions remain unsolved in relation to how this biometric
methodology might be implemented.

Scent
(natural physiography)

Measurement of earlobes
(natural physiography)
Facial thermograms procedures
(natural physiography)

Keystroke dynamics
(bio-dynamics)

Signature Verification
(bio-dynamics)

Gait Recognition
(bio-dynamics)

SOME PROMISING EMERGENT BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES
Emerging technologies include instant DNA testing and brain wave scanning. In 10 to 20 years
these technologies may present a practical and more reliable alternative for instant identity
verification.
Instant DNA Testing
Instant DNA testing could be used for both authentication and identification. Currently, DNA
testing is extremely accurate but requires specially equipped laboratories, rigorous procedures,
and takes time. It is extensively used for both identification and authentication purposes in law
enforcement but currently is not a practical option for real time security applications. However,
scientists at Northwestern University claim they developed an instant DNA identification
technique which will eventually be built into a handheld device [Connor, 2002].
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Brain Wave Scanning
Brain wave scanning is a promising technology. Neuroscientist Lawrence Farwell, who is now
associated with Brain Fingerprinting Laboratory, invented a technique he calls Brain
Fingerprinting ® (brain wave scanning).
Brain Fingerprinting® can detect information stored in one’s brain based on electrophysiological
manifestation of information processing in the brain [Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, 2005].
Information processing occurs in response to certain type of meaningful stimuli. An electrical
brain wave known as P300 is emitted by the brain when an individual is exposed to particularly
meaningful or noteworthy stimuli. For example, when an individual is shown a picture of the gun
she used to kill her husband, the P300 wave is likely to be emitted. However, when the individual
is shown a picture of a random gun, the P300 wave is not likely to be emitted. The picture of a
random gun is not as meaningful to her as the picture of the gun actually used in the crime. Brain
Fingerprinting can also be used for identifying individuals who are likely to pose a terrorist threat.
A suspected individual would be shown a series of pictures presumably familiar to terrorists such
as weapons while his brain is being scanned. If the suspect sees a familiar object (for example, a
picture of a bomb) his brain may emit a P300 wave. If this happens, the investigators may have
grounds to believe that the individual participated in a terrorist attack. The Brain Fingerprinting
technique has already been used in the courtroom to help to establish the innocence or guilt of
suspects.
“Brain fingerprinting” can also be used for identity verification. An individual might be shown a
series of unique pictures that would be not be seen by anyone else (e.g. randomly generated by a
computer) and asked to memorize them. In the process of authentication, these pictures could be
shown again to the individual. Only the authorized person’s brain would emit the right response
(of course, given that the individual does not have disabilities preventing him from storing and
retrieving information from memory).
V. CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
On the most abstract level, biometric applications can be divided in three categories [Nanavati et
al., 2002]:
•

Logical Access. Biometrics can be used to control access to data or information
(intangible resources). This group of applications can be referred to as network
security applications.

•

Physical Access. Biometrics can be used to control access to tangible resources or
premises.

•

Identity Verification. Biometrics can be used to verify the identity of an individual or
check his or her identity against other data.

On a more practical level, applications of biometrics can be divided into forensic, civilian and
commercial applications [Jain et al., 2000]. As presented below in Table 6, each of these broad
categories has a number of concrete applications.
Table 6. Applications of Biometric Technologies by Sector
Law Enforcement

Civilian

Commercial

Criminal investigation
Corrections monitoring
Surveillance
Terrorism prevention

National ID
Driver’s license
Voting and Voter Registration
Welfare disbursement
Immigration control

PC/Network Access
Physical Access Control
Time and attendance
ATM
Transaction Security
Surveillance
Background check
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LAW ENFORCEMENT
The history of using biometrics for forensic applications is long and rather glorious. In essence,
forensic applications of biometric technologies aim at identifying or verifying identity of a suspect,
detainee, or individual in a law enforcement context [Nanavati et al., 2002]. “Over the past 25
years, automated fingerprint searches against local, state, and national databases, as well as
automated processing of mug shots, have become pervasive criminal identification applications,
used around the world” [Nanavati et al., 2002, p. 152]. Numerous other types of biometric
technologies are currently used in law enforcement and crime prevention (Table 7).
Table 7. Applications of Biometric Technologies in Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention
Biometric Type

Applications

Agencies

Fingerprint

PC/Network Access

Most state identification bureaus
Many police departments
FBI

Retina

Identification of prisoners in jail

INS
Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff's
Office

Iris

Identification of prisoners in jail

Lancaster County, PA

Sarasota County, FL
Face

Hand

Searching mug shots
Surveillance video cameras
Driver's licenses

Los Angeles County, Sheriff
Newham, England police
West Virginia

Driver's licenses

Illinois

Prisoner identification
Probationer monitoring
Border control

Federal and state prisons
3 Minnesota prisons
New York City corrections

INS
Voice

Border control

Probationer monitoring

INS
Some corrections agencies

Reprinted with permission from Coleman [1999]
A relatively new forensic application of biometrics is using face recognition for active surveillance.
Face recognition systems allow law enforcement agencies to increase surveillance, tracking, and
apprehension of criminals. For example, in 1998 Newham, a borough in London, installed 250
surveillance cameras to feed information to the FaceIt® Surveillance system [Identix Inc., 2000].
The system continuously matches the images of people captured by the surveillance cameras
with a database of suspects and known criminals. If a match is found, the system alerts law
enforcement agencies about the match. Robert Lack, Newham's Security and Operations
Manager, credits the system with 40% crime reduction in the borough [Identix Inc., 2000].
However, the exact procedure for assessing effectiveness of the system was not reported.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States government began exploring
biometrics technologies for use in preventing acts of terror. Biometrics is one of the technologies
currently used by the Department of Homeland Security to identify people who might be a threat
to national security.
CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS
National ID
Using biometrics for national IDs and driver licenses provides a more reliable way of identifying
individuals [Schimke et al., 2005]. Additional benefits of this application of biometrics include
prevention of duplicate identities and faster processing of transactions requiring individual
identification [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Jurisdictions in the Unites States including Illinois, Georgia,
and West Virginia either deployed or are planning to deploy identification programs based on
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biometrics. Such countries as Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Bolivia, Argentina, Nigeria,
Germany, Korea, and the United Kingdom are either experimenting or already using biometric
information with national IDs, to some extent.
Driver’s License (DL)
In the Unites States, the driver license is the most widely used form of personal identification.
People fake DLs not so much to be able to drive a car, but to commit other forms of fraud, such
as passing bad checks, committing credit card fraud, illegally purchasing alcohol and tobacco,
and stealing others’ identity for all kinds of purposes. Because of that, the United States is
seeking new ways to control the issuance of DLs and, thus, strengthen the reliability of this form
of identity [Coleman, 1999]. A number of states use fingerprinting to verify the identity of DL
recipients. West Virginia was the first state to apply facial recognition to DLs. The major goal of
this application is to prevent people from obtaining an extra DL for use as a fake ID.
Voting and Voter Registration
Voting and voter registration is an extremely important procedure and must be protected against
possible fraud. Biometrics can help achieve this goal [Nanavati et al., 2002]. Mexico is using
facial recognition to prevent voting fraud. Face biometrics was also used in Uganda’s 2001
election for the same purpose. However, the technology encountered some degree of hostility
from voters in Uganda – voters felt that face recognition compromises the anonymity of the voting
process.
Welfare Disbursement
Biometrics are used in government benefit programs for two purposes: to ensure secure transfer
of funds to eligible recipients and to prevent “double dipping” – the fraudulent practice where an
eligible recipient receives governmental support more than once [Coleman, 1999]. Table 8 briefly
describes the use of biometrics for authentication of welfare recipients in the United States in
1998.
Immigration Control
After the 9/11 attack, the U.S. government began using biometrics in hopes of preventing
terrorists from entering the United States and for overall tighter control of visitors to the United
States. Everyone entering the United States with a visa must now permit fingerprints and
photographs to be taken and scrutinized by the U.S. Customs Service [BBC News, 2004]. It is
estimated that the system will generate around five million gigabytes of biometric data per year
[Betts, 2003]. While this enormous amount of data may certainly contribute to terror prevention, it
also creates several technical problems. A system with this much data requires ultra-fast
Table 8. Biometric in Welfare Distribution (1998 Data)
State
AZ

Biometric Type
Fingerprints

Benefit
Year Began
AFDC (Aid For Dependent Children),
1998
food stamps
CA
Fingerprints, hand geometry
AFDC, GA (General Assistance), food
1991
stamps
CT
Fingerprints
AFDC, GA
1996
IL
Fingerprints, retina
AFDC
1996
MA
Fingerprints, face
AFDC, GA, food stamps
1996
NJ
Fingerprints
GA
1995
NY
Face, signature fingerprints
AFDC, GA, food stamps
1995
TX
Fingerprints
AFDC, food stamps
1996
NC
Fingerprints, face
AFDC, food stamps, medical
1998
Reprinted with permission from Coleman [1999]. This data is the latest available to the authors.
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database and networking technologies to ensure that travelers entering the U.S. are processed
without significant delays.
COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
Table 9 gives a brief overview of actual applications of various types of biometrics. The list
provided in Table 9 is by no means comprehensive – it focuses on some of the main trends in
commercial application of biometrics.
PC/Network Access
Biometrics can be used to complement or replace traditional login/password combination for
access to computers and networks. One of the advantages of using biometrics for PC/Network
access is that biometrics are believed to be more secure than traditional PC/Network security
measures, such as passwords or tokens. Another advantage of biometrics over traditional
security approaches in the area of PC/Network Access is convenience. Biometrics alleviates the
burden of remembering different login/password combinations for accessing intangible assets.
Moreover, swiping a finger to access a computer is more convenient than typing in a username
and a password.
Physical Access
Better security and convenience are also important factors in implementing biometric technology
for controlling access to facilities and other tangible resources. Again, swiping a finger on a finger
scan or submitting one’s face to the face-scan procedure may be more convenient than using
keys or magnetic cards. Physical access artifacts can be lost, stolen, or misplaced, causing
inconvenience for employees. Moreover, some employees share their access artifacts with
others, which can create additional security vulnerability for the company. However, it always
takes time for employees to absorb a new technology. Biometric access systems are likely to
result in a higher failure rate when compared to, say, keys. Reported cases describe employees
smashing a biometric device in despair after several unsuccessful attempts to access a premise.
Time and Attendance Monitoring
Using biometrics in time and attendance applications can mean better convenience for
employees and better fraud protection for the employer. “Buddy punching”, a situation where an
employee “clocks in” for his or her buddy, is relatively common. When, a finger is used for
clocking in, an employee must lend a finger to the “punching buddy”. This may not be worth even
a year’s pay.
ATM Access
ATMs are important nodes in the financial network of many countries. ATM security can be
strengthened with the help of biometrics. Currently, a number of banks and other financial
institutions around the world use various forms of biometrics (e.g. hand vein scanning) for ATM
access [Asawa et al., 2005]. Still, using biometrics with ATM access is not common. Since ATMs
are used on a large scale by diverse populations, a number of issues must be resolved before
ATM biometrics becomes a commonplace. For example, when Citibank experimented with using
biometrics as an authentication tool in ATMs [Mearian, 2002], the company encountered serious
difficulties and decided that they were not ready to implement the technology. Apart from the
numerous technical difficulties that usually accompany any emerging technology, implementing
biometric identification in ATMs required substantial startup resources to capture customers’
biometric information and educate the public on how to use ATM biometric identification
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Table 9. Commercial Applications of Biometrics3
Biometric
Type
Fingerprint

Application
Type
Network/ PC
Access
Physical
Access/ Time
and
Attendance
POS

ATM
Wireless
Security
Background
Check
Hand

Retina

ATM
Physical
Access
Time and
Attendance
Physical
Access
POS

Iris

Physical
Access
POS

Face

Physical
Access
Surveillance

Voice4

PC/Network
access
Physical
access
Telephone
security

3
4

Companies
The city of Oceanside, California; Credit Union Central, British Columbia;
The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, USA
Hermes Pension Management Limited, UK; Credit Suisse, Switzerland;
Shell Petroleum, UK; Fujitsu, UK; O’Rourke Construction Company, UK

A number of small companies in the United States use BioPay – an
automated terminal where purchases can be paid for by scanning a finger
(instead of swiping a credit card or paying cash)
Purdue Employees Federal Credit Union, IN
HP manufactures iPAQ PDAs with fingerprint biometric access protection
Aramco Saudi Arabia National Oil Company; Melon Bank, USA; ING
Direct, USA
Japanese banks used hand vein recognition technology from Fujitsu to
enhance ATM security
Disney World: gate access to attractions; San Francisco International
Airport: hand geometry is used to control access to restricted areas
McDonald’s uses fingerprinting to prevent “buddy punching” among its
restaurant employees in Venezuela
Retina scanning is used for physical access control in organizations
requiring highly secure environment, such as power plants and some
research labs
Venerable Bede School, UK: retina scan for library check-out and
cafeteria payment
Vertical Screen; North Florida Medical Centers; Nine Zero hotel, Boston:
retina scanning for room access for some of its luxury suits
The Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, NC and the Flughafen
Frankfort Airport, Germany: iris scan for streamlining boarding of frequent
fliers
Berlin Airport, Germany
A number of casinos in the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico and
Aruba use face surveillance solution from Biometrica Systems to identify
unwanted patrons
BMC Software: password reset over the phone; INTRUST bank: internal
wire transfers
City of Baltimore: evening and weekend access to five city main buildings

Time and
attendance

University of Maryland, College Park: toll-free long distance lines for
faculty and staff; GTE TSI: speaker verification as a part of the wireless
security program
SOC Credit Union: Time and attendance monitoring of part-time
employees; Salvation Army: time and attendance monitoring of workers

Transaction
Security

Glenview State Bank: transfer of money between accounts for customers;
Home Shopping Network: automated product ordering over the phone

This table was compiled from numerous online and offline sources.
This section adopted from Markowitz [2000]
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Transaction Security
Biometric technology can be used to strengthen transactions conducted from remote locations
(e.g. via a phone, Internet, or Intranet). The biometric, such as voice recognition or fingerprinting,
can be used to complement or replace traditional authentication mechanisms. For example, voice
recognition is already used to authenticate a customer wishing to perform a financial transaction
over the phone [Markowitz, 2000]. In a similar manner, fingerprints can be used to authenticate a
person during e-commerce transactions.
Surveillance
Using biometrics (mainly face recognition) is a relatively new application. A number of casinos
around the word use automated face surveillance systems to identify unwanted customers (e.g.
customers who were previously caught cheating or causing some trouble). One of the
advantages of this application is that the procedure is not intrusive and can be used without
significant (if any) cooperation from casino patrons. Another advantage of this system is that it
frees up staff resources to some extent, since security guards can spend less time attempting to
identify troublemakers. However, the effectiveness of such systems in recognizing unwanted
customers is still not proven.
Background Check
Many organizations cannot afford to hire employees with questionable backgrounds. Biometrics
(usually fingerprints) can be used to check the background of potential employees. This system
may not require a significant amount of time to get off the ground, since numerous digital
fingerprint databases of criminals exist. A software application can be installed on the top of one
of these databases to get the system working.
VI. BIOMETRIC SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE
Computer-powered biometrics is still an emerging technology. Because computer-enabled
biometrics is not mature, organizations considering using the technology need to assess its
performance before proceeding with implementation. Performance of a biometric security system
can be evaluated in terms of its accuracy, storage requirements, and speed [Jain et al., 2000].
FNR and FMR
Mistakes are always possible in biometric systems. The system can accept an impostor as a valid
individual (a false match) or reject a valid individual (a false no match) [Jain et al. 2000]. These
types of mistakes constitute two important variables for assessing system performance: False No
Match Rate (FNR) and False Match Rate (FMR). These two variables are correlated negatively.
Indeed, if the system is designed to operate at a high level of accuracy, even a slight interference
(such as dust, or light conditions,) may result in the system not recognizing a valid individual.
Conversely, a system which operated at a lower level of accuracy may accept an imposter as an
authorized individual, making the system more vulnerable to intrusion. This limitation makes it
necessary to seek a balance in the level of accuracy along the Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) line (Figure 3). The ROC represents an estimation model for system
accuracy in a given test environment [Jain et al. 2000].
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False Match

Forensic Applications

Civilian

High Security
Access

False No Match Rate
Figure 3. Receiver Operating Characteristics [Jain et al. 2000]
FTE
Another measure of performance of biometric systems is Failure to Enroll Rate (FTE) [Navati et
al., 2002]. FTE can be defined as “the probability that a given individual will be unable to enroll in
a biometric system” [Navati et al., 2002, p. 33]. The two major reasons for FTE are:
1. An individual’s biometric characteristics may be insufficiently distinctive or replicable. For
example, older people or people whose work involves manual labor may have more
“blurry” fingerprints, making it difficult for the system to enroll them.
2. The design of a biometric system (e.g. its ergonomics) can make it difficult for certain
groups of people to enroll. For example, the study by UKPS [2005] found biometric data
(face, iris, and fingerprint) from younger or healthy individuals results in more accurate
authentication when compared to biometric data obtained from older or disabled
individuals. In the study, the 55+ age group found it more difficult to position themselves
for fingerprint enrollment than the 18-54 age group.
Moreover, the study found that it is harder for the system to record fingerprints of individuals with
large fingers (e.g. overweight individuals). Iris enrollment success for participants under 60 was
higher than those above 60. As a group, enrollment success for disabled participants was lower,
with 0.62% of disabled participants failing to enroll in any of the biometrics (face, iris, or
fingerprint). Table 10 summarizes the comparative FTE rate for “quota participants” (a
representative sample of 2000 people drawn from the UK population) and “disabled participants”
(750 individuals with some form of disability).
Storage and Other Technical Requirements
Biometric technologies require more storage, bandwidth, and processing power than traditional
security technologies. Storing digitized human body patterns requires more computer memory
than is required, for instance, for storing passwords (Table 11). A system that uses text for
profiling users generates only a fraction of the five petabytes that would be generated by the
same number of users in the US-VIST system, where each entrant to the U.S. submits his or her
fingerprints and his or her face image.
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Table 10. Comparative FTE Rates

Biometric
Type

FTE
(Quota
Participants)

FTE
(Disabled
Participants)

Face

0%

2%

Iris

10%

39%

Fingerprint

0%

4%

Additional Considerations
Maintaining the correct position for facial biometric
enrollment was a problem for some disabled
participants with physical impairment or learning
disabilities
Asian and white participants had lower FTE than
black participants. Participants under 60 years of
age had lower FTE than participants over 60
years
Participants with a learning or physical disability
had higher FTE than other disabled participants
and quota participants

Adapted from UKPS [2005]

Table 11. Comparative Template Size for Biometrics
Biometric
Type

Voice

Signature

Face

Iris

Finger

Retina

Hand
Geometry

Template
Size
(bytes)

2,000-10,000

1,500

1,300

512

250

96

9

Adapted from Nanavati et al. [2002]
In addition to storage requirements, transferring scanned biometrics requires expanded network
bandwidth. Moreover, the computer processing power requirements for matching a user name
and a password with a particular record in a database of logins and passwords are not nearly as
high as for applying complex pattern recognition algorithms to biometric input. These increased
requirements for computer processing capacity are closely related to system speed. Unless
sufficient computer resources are provided, a biometric system does not function at an
acceptable performance level.
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
In addition to purely technical criteria for evaluating system performance, social factors can also
play a big role in the overall system effectiveness. System evaluation measures on the human
side involve acceptability and circumvention [Jain et al., 2000]. Acceptability is the extent to
which people are willing to accept a biometric solution in their daily lives. It can be argued that
acceptability consist of two sub-factors: intrusiveness and ease of use. Some of the scanning
techniques may be invasive and troublesome, which may cause end-user resistance.
Circumvention refers to how easy it is to fool a system through fraudulent means. People may not
be willing to sacrifice their privacy knowing that systems can be easily spoofed. Acceptability and
circumvention is not only about subjective human perceptions. Users’ perceptions towards the
system will determine whether the system is used effectively (or used at all).
VII. PRIVACY ISSUES
Each type of biometric provides irrefutable proof of one’s identity [Jain et al., 2004]. A biometric is
not a login/password combination that can be easily modified. A biometric is not an ID that can be
nullified in case of theft and then reissued. A person has only one instance of each biometric trait
and will never have a new one. Once a user submits his or her biometric to a system, the user is
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in the system for good. Because of that, users are concerned about the privacy aspects of
biometric technology [Jain et al., 2004]:
•

Will this undeniable proof of identity be used to track the individual beyond his or her
interaction with a system requiring the user’s biometric information? Moreover, can
this type of tracking be carried out without the individual being aware of it?

•

Is it possible that biometric data will be used for unintended purpose? For example,
the fingerprints obtained from individual for access control can be matched with the
fingerprints in a database of criminals.

•

Will the biometric data be used to cross-link independent records from the same
person (e.g. health insurance and grocery shopping)?

Individuals are concerned that with the help of biometric technologies, his or her privacy will be
compromised. Altman [1975, p.24] defines privacy as “…the selective control of access to the
self,” while Mason [1986] looks at privacy as the extent to which an individual is required to reveal
information about himself or his association with others. One of the crucial questions related to
privacy is “what things can people keep to themselves and not be forced to reveal to others?”
[Mason, 1986, p. 5].
In light of the above definitions, biometrics-based identification technologies, such as facial
recognition, appear to pose a great privacy risk. A security camera does not ask for consent
before capturing an image. Control over personal information is therefore weakened. Agre
[2003], a strong opponent of facial recognition, presents a comprehensive list of arguments
against its widespread adoption and use:
… automatic face recognition in public places, including commercial spaces such
as shopping malls that are open to the public, should be outlawed. The dangers
outweigh the benefits…The potential for abuse is astronomical. Pervasive
automatic face recognition could be used to track individuals wherever they go…
The information from face recognition systems is easily combined with
information from other technologies. Among the many "biometric" identification
technologies, face recognition requires the least cooperation from the
individual… The technology is hardly foolproof…Among the potential downsides
are false positives, for example that so-and-so was "seen" on a street frequented
by drug dealers… Yet the conditions for image capture and recognition in most
public places are far from ideal. Shadows, occlusions, reflections, and multiple
uncontrolled light sources all increase the risk of false positives… Face
recognition is nearly useless for the application that has been most widely
discussed since the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington:
identifying terrorists in a crowd… 5
While identification systems invoke Orwellian or, more currently, Minority Report images of a total
surveillance society, authentication systems pose a threat of their own. Schneier [1999], a wellknown cryptologist and computer security expert, warns:
Biometrics don’t handle failure well, Once someone steals your biometric, it
remains stolen for life; there’s no getting back to a secure situation.
Indeed, an individual only has one set of fingerprints. Once someone’s fingerprints are stolen,
they are stolen for life. No governmental agency can annul your old fingerprints and issue you
new ones. The dilemma here is that biometrics can help prevent identity theft but can also,

5

Reprinted with permission from Philip Agre
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simultaneously, complicate the problem of identity theft, as argued by Schneier in the quote
above.
Still, many in the biometrics industry believe that properly deployed biometrics will increase
privacy, since if an individual’s biometrics are known, no other information such as race, gender,
or social security number is required. Moreover, it can be argued that privacy threats come not as
much from the nature of the technology itself, but rather from the particular way in which the
technology is applied and from the system design used to support the applications [Nanavati et
al., 2002]. This sentiment is not limited to the biometrics industry. The well-known sociologist
Amitai Etzioni [1999] believes that benefits of privacy should be weighed against its costs and
that biometric technologies may bring about huge benefits to consumers and businesses as well
as enhance privacy. Etzioni [1999] believes Big Brother fears are overstated. He believes that
new identification technologies do not control individuals – totalitarian governments do. Thus,
“Strengthening the foundations of civil society is the best defense against
totalitarianism, not trying vainly to return the genie of biometrics into the bottle
from which it already has escaped.” Etzioni [1999].
Still, privacy concerns must be addressed and those concerns seem only likely to increase with
the future adoption of technologies such as DNA fingerprinting. The biometrics industry and
privacy advocates both favor adoption of comprehensive regulations to prevent possible biometric
abuses and protect privacy and civil rights while allowing the industry to develop. They disagree,
however, on the source of those regulations. Many privacy advocates favor government
regulation, contending that industry self-regulation will fail. Clarke [2004] laments “…selfregulation means protection of the sheep by the wolves; and funnily enough the wolves pay more
attention to their own objectives than to those of the sheep.”
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Biometrics is an evolving technology. Because of the technology’s relative immaturity, numerous
challenges must be overcome in system performance, user acceptance, technology diffusion,
system security, and privacy among others. These problems call for a multidisciplinary research
approach.
The solution to the challenge of biometric system performance may lie in Computer Science and
Engineering. While some types of biometric technologies (e.g. fingerprinting) achieved levels of
performance which make these applications acceptable for everyday use, many other types of
biometric technologies need performance improvements to become viable security solutions. The
focus of research on improving the performance of biometric systems is likely to be in the
computer infrastructure associated with biometric solutions and algorithms and methods of
biometric technologies.
User acceptance of biometric technology and diffusion of biometrics within organizations and
countries are other potentially fruitful avenues for research. Even the most reliable, efficient, and
productive technology can do little for an organization unless users adopt the technology.
Adoption of biometric technology may be influenced by both objective (e.g. the speed at which
biometric devices authorize an individual) and subjective factors (e.g. attitudes and perceptions
towards the new technology).
A number of factors can prevent biometrics from being adopted by organizations and counties.
For example, using biometrics as a security tool may require substantial modifications of the
computer infrastructure used to support the technology. Moreover, diffusion of biometric
technologies may require modification or even total reengineering of both technical and
managerial security procedures currently in place in organizations. These issues clearly lie within
the domain of Information Systems research.
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Information security and privacy in the context of biometric technology may influence user
acceptance of biometrics and diffusion of the technology. Technical and managerial (in the case
of security) and legal (in the case of privacy) research may find solutions that will minimize the
negative impact of security and privacy concerns on the adoption and diffusion of biometric
technologies.
IX. CONCLUSION
Biometrics relies on a body of knowledge developed over centuries. Advancements in computer
technology brought biometrics to a higher level of effectiveness, allowing for use of the
technology in a variety of security applications. In many ways, biometrics is more reliable than
traditional security approaches. However, a number of unresolved issues (such as privacy
concerns and relatively high cost of large-scale biometric solutions) often make biometrics a less
attractive alternative in comparison with traditional security measures. Advances in computing
technology and related areas of research gradually allow for better processing of biometric
information. As businesses gain more experience in deploying biometric security measures,
biometrics should become a major security technology in the years ahead.
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